

CONFIDENTIAL

1 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Performance  
Evaluation and Improvement

ATTENTION : [REDACTED]

FROM : [REDACTED]  
NFAC Executive Officer

SUBJECT : CIA Scientific & Technical  
Intelligence (S&TI) Products

REFERENCE : Your memo dated 15 August 1978,  
same subject

1. The draft study addresses some long existing problems and offers some useful recommendations. We agree with the stated objectives of the report which are to improve intelligence sharing in the S&TI field. However, we do not feel that sufficient credit was given in the study to existing coordinating mechanisms such as STIC, JAEIC and WSSIC.

2. We recognize that there is sometimes duplication of effort between DoD and CIA in production of S&TI. However, such apparent duplication often demonstrates how the same data can be analyzed differently, with the resulting alternate interpretations providing the decisionmaker a range of choices. Consequently, some duplication of effort, particularly on potentially controversial issues is desirable. Attached memorandum from the Director of DIA basically makes the same point. Moreover, a joint planning system detailed enough to ensure a complete absence of duplication would limit our ability to change our programs to respond to changing intelligence information and new requirements.

3. Specifically:

Recommendations 1, 2 & 5. We agree that our S&TI production plans should be made available to DIA and in turn to the material acquisition community and are taking steps to

25X1


CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

comply. OSR, for example, has already been providing production plans to DIA (see attached memo from D/DIA.) We also agree that we should use DIA CAST in planning our program. Neither OWI or OSR presently receive copies and we will undertake to order additional copies.

Recommendation 3. Dissemination of CIA documents is already controlled by DIA. If this has not proved satisfactory perhaps DoD should supply a distribution list and let CIA disseminate directly.

Recommendation 6. When possible CIA does sanitize its publications. We strongly disagree, however that this can be done easily. Our experience has been that the logic of a paper is destroyed, particularly in S&T papers, with the deletion of highly classified evidence. As a result, the paper has to be argued differently (on a different evidential base) and, thus, almost totally re-thought and re-written. This is a laborious and time consuming undertaking.



25X1

Attachment:  
As stated

CONFIDENTIAL



11 MAY 1973


U-5313/DM-3A

Mr. S. N. Graybeal  
Director, Strategic Research  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Graybeal:

I appreciate your sending the listing of OSR proposed projects which I found very informative and useful. I note that there appears to be some parallelism in the Soviet, Warsaw Pact, PRC, and North Korean areas, which is probably appropriate in cases of imperfect and incomplete data bases. It is noteworthy that the majority of OSR's scheduled products address questions/issues contained in the Key Intelligence Requirements (KIR) of the Secretary of Defense's Consolidated Guidance document. I hope that you will consult these lists of DoD intelligence needs in future planning of OSR's production effort.

Sincerely,

  
EUGENE F. TIGHE, JR.  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171R000400110015-6

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171R000400110015-6